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Abstract
The nuclear accident of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors on March 11, 2011, could have 
been prevented if the owner and the responsible Japanese ministries had considered the 
worst-case scenario when planning the reactors near the coast, including at least double 
redundancy of the emergency system. After the exceptionally strong earthquake, the 
reactors correctly switched off. The problem started due to the tsunami that destroyed 
the emergency generators, which should have driven the cooling pumps after the reactor-
power had switched off. The Zr-alloy mantles of the fuel rods reacted at the high tem-
perature with water to form ZrO
2
 and hydrogen. The following explosions, destruction of 
the reactor buildings and meltdown caused large radioactive clouds and the evacuation 
of 150,000 people. This chapter shows how by immediate efforts most of this cloud could 
have been sucked off. The radioactive soil from large contaminated areas was later col-
lected in plastic sacks. Continuous cooling led to huge amounts of contaminated water 
that was collected in large tanks. In future, the reactor has to be dismantled resulting in 
contaminated debris. In this chapter, the possible solutions of radioactive cloud, soil, 
water and rubble problems and the final deposit of used fuel rods are discussed. The 
experiences could become useful in case of a future nuclear accident.
Keywords: Fukushima accident, tsunami risk, radioactive cloud, contaminated soil and 
water, reactor dismantling, nuclear risk, energy future
1. Introduction
With increasing world population, with increasing industrialization of less-developed coun-
tries and with increasing electric mobility, the demand of nuclear energy will increase. When 
renewable energy from the wind and the sun increases worldwide, from the present 0.8%, 
then nuclear energy will be needed as base energy to compensate the lack of electric energy 
when the wind is not blowing and the sun not shining. Furthermore, with the limited world 
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resources of coal and oil, and with the required reduction of CO
2
 emission with regard to the 
climate problem, the role of nuclear energy will increase in most industrialized countries. 
Accordingly, nuclear reactors are being built or are planned to be built in most countries 
except Germany and Switzerland where, by emotional decisions taken after the Fukushima 
accident, nuclear energy is planned to be terminated. These two countries could then be faced 
with lack of reliable electric power supply and with the increasing cost of electricity from 30 
to 50%, a risk for industries and for the expected electric mobility. Their choice will be the 
import of nuclear energy from neighbor countries (with increasing risks of radioactive clouds 
in case of future accidents) or the installation of gas-power plants with dependence on gas 
supply and with emission of CO
2
. Energy policies should be discussed in view of sustainable 
management of limited energy sources [1] until in the far future nuclear fusion energy may 
hopefully be developed [2].
Most of the present 450 plus nuclear reactors are of type II Pressurized Light-Water-Moderated 
and Cooled Reactors. The energy efficiency of the uran-235-based fuel rods is only 1.5–5%. 
Their recycling yields plutonium needed for nuclear bombs, the reason why this reactor type 
was pushed by the US military. On the other hand, can the later recovery of used fuel rods 
from the storage site of radioactive waste become a significant source of energy for future 
generations? Now 60 reactors of higher energy efficiency are being built or are planned on 
being built, with the example of the European Pressure-Water Reactor being built in Finland.
The risk for life and health of the nuclear energy is much smaller than the risks of fossil energy 
and of renewable energy taking into account the direct fatalities and the after-effects from air 
pollution from burning fossil fuel [3] and from the role of CO
2
 for climate change. The new 
generation of safe type III and type IV generators including thorium reactors will have high 
energy efficiency, cause significantly less radioactive waste and shorten the required stor-
age time for radioactive waste [4]. Until these modern reactors are fully developed, mankind 
should learn from experiences of the two nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima 
with respect to optimized planning of the safe site of the reactor including its safety infra-
structure, considering the worst-case scenario of all possible risks. The following discussion 
of the Fukushima problems may help in case one of the existing nuclear reactors should have 
an accident although the probability is extremely small. After the Fukushima incident, the 
existing nuclear reactors in Japan should be checked with respect to the worst-case scenario 
of earthquake and flooding risks. Also, the risks of extremely complex technologies should 
be considered. One could discuss whether all reactors worldwide should be checked by an 
international specialist team, possibly under guidance from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna taking into account the national nuclear safety organizations.
2. Critical planning phase of the Fukushima Daiichi plant
The start of a nuclear power plant requires the study of all potential risks like earthquakes, 
landslides, aviation routes, the risks of flooding from mountain sides and from seaside 
and extreme weather. Also, the groundwater situation has to be considered. The primary 
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responsibility is with the owner of the plant and its planning team. The government and 
its ministries have the main control function, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna has the obligation to supervise the safety aspects especially in view of pre-
venting proliferation of nuclear material.
In case of the Fukushima Daiichi plant, the owner company did not consider the worst-case 
scenario for financial reasons [5]: Despite the in-house study which revealed the possibility 
of 10 m high tsunami waves, the company’s headquarters declared such a risk as unrealis-
tic. Also, warnings from the Research Institute of Earthquake and Volcano Geology of the 
Geological Survey of Japan and of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission were not followed 
by the company and by the responsible safety agency of Japan. This agency had a conflict of 
interest and was replaced in September 2012 by the Nuclear Regulation Authority under the 
Ministry of the Environment [6].
In order to protect the Fukushima coast against tsunami with the miss-judged low heights 
of the waves, seawalls of about 10 m height were erected, see Figure 1. This photo was taken 
after the accident and also shows the tanks with radioactive contaminated water. The north 
seawall shows the remaining low height (probably caused by the tsunami) and the two sea-
walls of the remaining height of claimed 10 m.
The plant owner failed to arrange safe electric backup generators and a reliable emergency 
cooling system which resulted in the primary cause of the Fukushima accident.
Earthquakes above magnitude 7.0 were of concern for the IAEA due to large earthquakes 
earlier. However, the March 11, 2011, earthquake with magnitude 9 did not damage the 
Fukushima plant [5], it caused the correct shutdown of all reactors.
Figure 1. Top view of Fukushima power plant Dezember 2015 with lateral and height dimensions.
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The failures of the planning phase and the actual causes and sequences of the Fukushima 
disaster have been analyzed by an independent commission which was appointed by the 
Japanese Government and which delivered the report July 5, 2012. The conclusion was that 
the accident could have been prevented and that it was man-made. Furthermore, the evacu-
ation conditions were criticized as they caused 1600 fatalities due to stress from the hectic 
exaggerated evacuation, whereas radiation did not cause direct death [5].
The Fukushima accident has demonstrated the interaction of neighbor reactors: the meltdown 
problem of reactor 1 effected meltdown and hydrogen explosions in reactors 3 and 4. As con-
sequence, a minimum distance between reactors of say 50 m should be demanded in future 
and all reactors provided with individual emergency power supplies, pumps and other safety 
equipment. In existing rows of reactors, they should be separated, for instance, by steel plates 
and have individual safety equipment, all with at least three-fold redundancy.
3. Effects of the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami
Japan is situated on the Pacific Ring of Fire with active plate tectonics where the Pacific Plate 
is subducting the Eurasian Plate and thus causes frequent earthquakes. The country has spent 
remarkable efforts to reduce the risks of collapsing buildings. When earthquakes of magni-
tude larger than 6.5 occur in the sea, they may cause tsunami depending on the displacement 
of the seafloor actually caused [7]. Such tsunami can lead to flooding on the coast and cause 
numerous fatalities: in case of the 2011 tsunami, 19,000 fatalities and large damages. However, 
such tsunami catastrophes are not so frequent so that protection measures have been realized 
only in a few areas. Frequently, classical breakwaters are constructed by placing heavy cais-
sons onto rubble mounts or foundations which have a slope on the seaside [8]. The typical 
failures of such breakwaters consist of sliding or tilting of the caissons [9]. One example is the 
harbor city Kamaishi north of Sendai at the Honshu/Japan coast where, after experiencing the 
1896 tsunami catastrophe, the world’s largest breakwater was built in 31 years at the cost of 
1.3 billion US dollar. Only 6 months after celebrating the world record for Guinness Book of 
Records, the Tohoku tsunami of March 11, 2011, destroyed most of the breakwater and part 
of the Kamaishi harbor region and caused 1000 fatalities. Details of the construction of the 
combined breakwater and of the damages have been described [10]. Recently it was shown 
that this breakwater had been built on the wrong site with a non-optimal technology [11] and 
that a submerged barrier, with vertical wall toward the sea, at the entrance of Kamaishi bay 
would have prevented the local tsunami catastrophe.
The tsunami pressure (impulse) waves travel from the earthquake area at a high speed of 
typically 700 km/hour at an ocean depth of 4 km in all directions. The velocity c is given by
  c =  √ (g × h) (1)
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with g the gravitational acceleration and h the water depth. By the law of energy conservation, 
the kinetic energy of the pressure waves is transformed to potential energy when the wave 
approaches the coast with decreasing water depth according to
  A 2 × c = constant (2)
where, A is the amplitude or wave height. With a starting wave height between 0.3 and 1 m in the 
deep sea, the wave height will increase at the coast to 3 and 10 m and can rise in narrowing bays 
to values up to 38 m as observed 2011 with the Tohoku tsunami [11]. As a consequence, the sea-
side of submerged buildings in the sea should not have slopes, should always be vertical walls.
In order to prevent the tsunami flooding catastrophes, the concept of a submerged vertical 
barrier (wall) has been developed which reflects the tsunami impulse waves and also the 
storm surges from a typhoon so that these Tsunami-Flooding-Barriers (TFB) would have pre-
vented the Fukushima disaster [11].
In the case of the Fukushima plant, three classical breakwaters (seawalls) have been built as 
shown in Figure 2.
The northern breakwater in the Google photo, taken after the accident, shows a low height 
and flat surface indicating that the caissons on top of the rubble mound foundations may have 
slit down. The western and southern breakwaters showed a height between 10 m and 13 m 
and thus were still intact.
The tsunami pressure wave, which arrived from the north-eastern direction, is indicated 
in Figure 2 by the red arrow. The wave height was increased at the slope of the northern 
breakwater. Then the tsunami energy was focused by the two remaining breakwaters toward 
south-west explaining that the southern Reactor 1 with its emergency auxiliary equipment 
was damaged, whereas the northern reactors 5 and 6 were not affected from the tsunami.
The height of the tsunami water front was estimated as 13—15 m, but in view of the concen-
tration effect, it may have been locally significantly higher when approaching the southern 
reactors 1– 4 and their emergency equipment.
The following description of events is a concentrated summary of reports detailed in [5].
From the six reactors, the units 4–6 had been shut down for a normal-scheduled inspection. 
The reactors 1–3 had been operating and were immediately switched off when the earthquake 
struck. Therefore, the reactors did not produce electricity and could not use their own power. 
The available emergency diesel generators were disabled from the floods; also, the switching 
stations for the diesel generators at higher position were flooded. Furthermore, the attempts 
to connect the water pumps to portable generators failed. Due to lack of sufficient cooling, 
the fuel rods with zircaloy mantle reached temperatures above 1000°C where the exothermic 
reaction Zr + 2 H
2




 produced explosive hydrogen. This then caused in the 
following days successive explosions in reactors 1, 3 and 4 destroying the roofs and tops of 
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the reactor buildings. Cooling the fuel rods was essential even when the reactors had been 
switched off. The helplessness of the owner’s management became obvious when on TV one 
could observe helicopters dropping water onto the reactor ruins and ships which directed 
water guns toward the reactors. Insufficient cooling therefore could not prevent the melt-
down of the fuel which then fused through to the bottom of the reactor pressure vessel and 
partially went through to the primary containment vessel of concrete 7.6 m thick where it is 
assumed to have stopped.
Figure 2. Top view of Fukushima Daiichi Reactors with two intact sea walls and one remnant wall. The two walls 
focused the tsunami energy and led to increased secondary tsunami water wave.
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Attempts to investigate the situation inside the reactors by muon scanning and by a remote-
controlled camera have proven the meltdown of the fuel and its lowering to the concrete 
containment vessel.
A large amount of radioactive materials of 130 petabequerels has been released into the 
air from March 11 to April 5, 2011, which corresponds to 11% of the Chernobyl emissions. 
Accordingly, the heavily contaminated area around Fukushima corresponded to 10–12% of 
the Chernobyl area. The sea was contaminated by about 84 kg of cesium-137 corresponding 
to 27 petabequerels whereby 82% flowed into the sea before April 8, 2011. This contamina-
tion consisted of controlled and uncontrolled release of contaminated water, of surface water 
flowing over contaminated soil and of airborne radioactive particles that entered the sea by 
rain. The attempts of the owner’s company to stop the flow of contaminated water to the sea 
by a 30 m-deep wall in the ground and by an underground ice wall have been only partially 
successful. On September 10, 2015, the typhoon Etau caused an uncontrolled flow of contami-
nated water into the ocean.
Studies have shown that contamination of the ocean as measured would not have long-term 
effects on health due to the powerful Kuroshio current and the dilution in the wide Pacific. 
The contamination through the air into the ground requires the collection of radioactive soil in 
millions of plastic bags in order to facilitate the return of the evacuated people to their homes.
The World Health Organization (WHO) and other institutions and organizations evaluated 
the health risks which are expected to be small for most of the population due to the estimated 
small amount of received radiation [12]. The main health effects have been observed with 
the evacuated people of which 1600 died from stress and suicide, not from cancer. The main 
cause of these fatalities is due to the accident and the hectic exaggerated evacuation, but a 
certain responsibility have the green-political parties, organizations and media with exces-
sive reports about the accident and risks. The extremely low personal value of 1 millisievert 
(mSv) per year from artificial radiation in Japan is in contrast to international annual doses of 
20 mSv as accepted by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and the 
World Health Organization (WHO). Due to the low received radiation, no significant health 
effects are expected for the population of cities within the 20-mile zone around the Fukushima 
plant. The March 2015 thyroid gland investigation of 300,000 children effectively showed no 
noticeable cases.
There are enormous costs for the owner company and for Japanese taxpayers for compensa-
tion, decontamination, dismantling the reactors and radioactive waste storage, exceeding 187 
billion US dollars. The main consideration will be Japan’s energy future in view of lack of 
resources and resistance from the population. In view of the crucial importance of nuclear 
energy for Japan’s future, as a personal responsibility, opponents of nuclear energy could 
consider reducing their electricity consumption during periods of electricity shortage.
Emergency actions and consequences for reducing the aftereffects in case of a future, most-
improbable nuclear accident are discussed later.
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4. Discussion on the possible management problems after 
March 11, 2011
4.1. Missed chances to reduce the contamination level
The nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and in Fukushima have caused huge contamination of 
cities, villages and land and had necessitated the evacuation of ten-thousands of people a 
fraction of which in case of Chernobyl had received hazardous radiation.
In case of a such nuclear accident, there are two aspects which require immediate action:
1. Can the fission rate and the development of uncontrolled heating of the fuel rods be 
stopped from the control room or by remote actions to lift the fuel rods or by introducing 
neutron-absorbing elements or compounds based on boron, silver, cadmium and indium 
combined with intensive cooling, decisions to be made immediately by an experienced 
reactor engineer.
2. In case of fire or escaping flames and clouds, the collateral damage by widespreading 
of radioactivity has to be minimized by very intense water spraying using any water 
resources, be it from nearby lake or river or sea and using water pumps and high-power 
water guns powered from pre-installed and mobile diesel generators. When a natural 
water source cannot be reached, then the installation of a nearby pond of sufficient volume 
should be arranged near all reactors. Contamination of the sea is less harmful than con-
tamination of cities, villages and landscapes. The optimum would be sea reservoirs built 
with the Tsunami-Flooding Barriers [11]. With visible installations for the water guns out-
side the reactor building, with watering exercises and with proper information, people can 
be assured that evacuation will not be required in the future, even in case of an accident.
If a long-lasting fire occurs as in Chernobyl, where the graphite moderator burnt and sent 
radioactive clouds very high so that contamination spread over large distances or in case of 
Fukushima, where the cloud left the reactor building and was carried by wind, intensive suc-
tion should be considered. Figure 3 schematically shows the reactor building with attached 
large-diameter steel pipes which collect the cloud by a powerful ventilator of at least 5000 m3 
per hour depending on tube diameter. A sprinkler system condenses the radioactive vapors 
and particles, and this contaminated water should then flow into the sea reservoir or into 
a basin. In case of Fukushima, this contaminated water should in the first phase have been 
transported by long pipes to the Kuroshio current where it is diluted. In the second phase, the 
gaps of 100 and 140 m between the existing seawalls/breakwaters could have been closed and 
water could have been pumped out to the basins where it could be collected and stored for 
later treatment. The intense spraying followed by the suction activity would have reduced the 
extended radioactive spreading and thus the evacuation requirements. Such suction systems 
could also be useful in case of accidents and fires in chemical factories and in oil refineries.
Reactor surrounding should always be covered by a thick concrete layer with a slope of 2–3° 
in the direction of the sea or the basin, so that all water is controlled and collected and the soil 
cannot be contaminated.
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The groundwater should never become a problem for the reactor by installing deep water-
tight barriers around the reactor area, before the reactor starts to work.
The successive hydrogen explosions, which destroyed a part of the reactors and their roofs, 
should have been prevented by hydrogen detectors, which raise an alarm and which activate 
valves for high-pressure injection of nitrogen or CO
2
. Hydrogen concentration should always 
be kept below the explosion level of 4% in air, this value depending on humidity and other 
factors. The alternative of Passive Autocatalytic (Hydrogen) Recombiners (PAR) [13] does not 
require electricity to operate and has been installed in some reactors worldwide. PAR had 
been applied in the Three-Mile-Island accident (March 28, 1979) to reduce the hydrogen con-
tent in a hydrogen bubble inside the reactor chamber to prevent a large explosion. Hydrogen 
removal works even in the presence of CO which is frequently formed in fires [14].
4.2. The contaminated water problem
After the initial weeks following the accident, large amounts of cooling water had been 
pumped into the reactors, for example, 300 metric tons per day, which initially was further 
diluted with 400 m3 groundwater. Despite large efforts taken to reduce the influx of ground-
water, it could not be stopped. Half of the water returning from reactor cooling was filtered 
and partially decontaminated and returned for cooling, and the other half of 200 m3 was 
collected daily in large storage tanks in the plant surroundings for later treatment. A fraction 
of this tank collection is shown in Figure 4.
Decontamination of water was problematic. Equipment from France, USA and Japan had 
been applied using reverse osmosis, adsorption by zeolites or evaporation of salt water. 
Figure 3. Schematic view of suction of radioactive cloud and sprinkling with seawater.
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Problems have been errors in handling of valves, repeated leakages of connections and pipes 
and stopped pumps which could not be re-activated. Reference [15] gives some details of the 
dramatic water contamination problems. From outside it looks like small-scale attempts to 
solve large-scale problems.
With the existence of the three seawalls in front of the coast of Fukushima plants, there is the 
possibility to connect the ends of these seawalls by new walls of 100 and 140 m length to form 
three basins as shown in Figure 5.
To construct these barriers by conventional technology with rubble mound foundations and 
top caissons [8] or to build concrete walls would be a lengthy process and not provide high-
est safety. Recently, two methods have been developed which allow efficient construction of 
submerged barriers at reduced costs [11, 16]. In a first step, deep “beds” are dredged into the 
bottom of the sea with the depth depending on the sea ground (rocks, gravel, sand, mud). 
In the double-pontoon technology, two separated pontoons start from a ramp road at the 
coast and allow to move trucks. The first truck inserts a stainless steel (316L, 316LN, 1.4429) 
fence outside the pontoons into the sea, for instance, stable fence of Geobrugg, Romanshorn, 
Switzerland. The next truck inserts alternating rocks and concrete in the gap between the 
pontoons into the sea. Distance holders allow to erect a stable vertical wall of 6 –20 m width. 
These central pontoons hang on steel beams between assisting pontoons in order to carry the 
heavy weights. The second technology uses long tall cylinders of more than 100 m length 
fabricated in the harbor and floated to the site where they are inserted into the sea bed and 
filled with rocks, sand, and so on. These walls named Tsunami-Flooding-Barriers (TFB) are 
vertical toward the sea and thus reflect the impulse waves of tsunami. They extend about 
10 m above sea level and carry a service road on top which is protected against storm waves 
by replaceable surge stoppers (parapets) [11].
Hydrodynamic modeling [17] of the action of TFB barriers by coupling the far-field depth-
averaged Boussinesq-type model pCOULWAVE of Lynett et al. [18] with a near-field 
Figure 4. Fraction of tanks with >300,000 m3 contaminated water at Fukushima power plant.
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Navier–Stokes Computational Fluid Dynamics CFD model [19] allowed a more accurate sim-
ulation of the fluid–structure interaction. The high efficiency of the TFB to reflect the tsunami 
impulse waves and the storm-wave reflection of the surge stopper (parapet) is confirmed. 
Furthermore, the loading onto the vertical walls has been estimated [17].
The TFB concept could find wide application as it protects coastal cities and industries, but also 
beaches against tsunami and against flooding from tropical storms like hurricanes and typhoons. 
Also, flora and fauna could be saved in case of an oil-spill. In the past 20 years, these natural 
Figure 5. De-contamination of water and release to the sea, schematic top view.
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catastrophes have caused a quarter of a million fatalities and damages exceeding 500 billion 
US dollars mainly in Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India and at the east 
coast of USA. In Japan, the TFB would have prevented in 2011 the 19,000 tsunami fatalities and 
300 billion US dollars damages with destroyed houses and, of course, it would have prevented 
the Fukushima catastrophe. For the countries with risk of storm and tsunami flooding, such a 
large project would stimulate the building, transport and steel industries and would occupy 
thousands of workers and thus would have a significant impact on the economic development.
Now Japan started a large project to build tall concrete walls, with height up to 14 m and 
width up to 46 m, along the coast of Honshu. The estimated costs are higher than building the 
TFB walls submerged in the sea at large distances from the coast, thereby not disturbing the 
view of the ocean for coastal citizens and for tourists. Fishermen would keep access to the sea. 
The population has formed a large resistance against the Japanese great wall of which only 
partial protection can be expected in case of a large tsunami which on March 11, 2011, had a 
reported maximum height of 38 m. The 500 km great wall along Honshu coast would consume 
23 million m2 land area plus land surface for the required construction and service roads.
The water from the three basins (shown in Figure 5) is pumped out before their bottom is 
covered with a thick concrete layer. Contaminated water from reactor cooling, from the 
collecting point of the sloped concrete ground and from the storage tanks flows into basin 
I. After passing through the first decontamination stage, it enters basin II and then through 
the next decontamination step to basin III. After checking the low residual radioactivity from 
cesium-134, cesium-137 and Sr-90, the remaining radioactivity will be from tritium. This has a 
short half-life time of 12.3 years and anyhow occurs naturally in seawater, formed by cosmic 
rays, in extremely low concentrations of hydrogen(10−18). Therefore, there is no risk if this 
tritium-containing water of basin III is transported through long pipes into the Kuroshio cur-
rent near the Japan trench which has a depth of 10 km. The short half-life time and the dilution 
effect will prevent the detection of tritium supply from Fukushima.
In view of the large quantity of contaminated water in the 1000 m3 tanks, a pre- decontamination 
step could be to introduce by stirring an isotope-adsorbing agent (e.g. zeolite) into the tank 
and letting it settle by gravity for sufficient time so that the deposit mud on the tank bottom 
can be sucked by slowly sweeping long tubes and then compacted by a drying process. An 
alternative could be salting-out and precipitate cesium-137 compounds. This would reduce 
the contamination level of the collected water and facilitate the final treatment.
4.3. Storage of radioactive waste
The storage of radioactive waste consisting of used fuel rods, of cut pieces of the reactor cham-
bers, of rubble from the reactor foundation and building and from contaminated soil collected 
from the reactor surrounding is a technological challenge but mainly a political problem. 
Therefore, a site near the reactor ruins could find minimum resistance from the public. Large 
amounts of concentrated radioactive waste were collected and transported to the temporary 
storage facility.
After solving the water problem, the three sea basins with the thick concrete bottom are 
pumped empty and used as a dump for radioactive waste with the final goal of reclaiming 
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new land. The rubble caused by the reactor explosions, the drums with sludge from the 
decontamination process, all the plastic bags with collected contaminated soil and all contam-
inated material presently stored in Interim Storage Facilities will be transported to this dump. 
Finally, the debris from scrapping the destroyed reactors 1–4 could be deposited in these 
basins. The concrete debris could partially be milled and used for new concrete buildings.
The schematic cross-section view (Figure 6) of this “Fukushima dump” shows the original 
reactor before dismantling as well as the dump in the basin which is protected against flood-
ing with the Tsunami-Flooding-Barrier. In view of keeping radiation and the elevated tem-
perature, the molten fuel rods, after sufficient cooling in 30–80 years, should be enclosed in 
tubes of a metal which is relatively stable against oxidation at ambient oxygen pressure and 
temperature and limited humidity. Theoretically, the best materials for encapsulation would 
be the noble metals silver, gold and platinum but their high value would make them too 
attractive and thus cause a risk for the storage site for radioactive waste. Figure 7 shows the 
temperature dependence of the thermodynamic stability of oxides of metals which could be 
applied as container for radioactive material. This Ellingham-type diagram [20], extended 
for CO–CO
2




O gas ratios by Richardson and Jeffes [21], is discussed in [22]. 
Practical values for temperature can be obtained by a straight line passing from one of the 
three points (O, H, C) on the left margin to the oxygen partial pressure or the gas ratios on the 
scales on the right side of the diagram and hitting the stability line of the specific metal. Iron-
nickel-chromium alloys (stainless steel) and lead could be considered, and copper is foreseen 
for enclosing radioactive material in Sweden.
Depending on the shape of molten fuel rods within their surrounding they could be cut to 
pieces and enclosed in capsules or in thin tubes of one of the suitable metals and then sealed. 
In any case, the fuel-rod-material should be safely stored in a site from which it can be recov-
ered by future generations to use the significant energy remaining in the fuel rods.
Figure 6. Storage of the rubble of the dismantled reactor building and of the collected contaminated soil in basin I which 
before had been emptied and covered with a thick concrete layer. After sufficient cooling the fused fuel is encapsulated 
and inserted into the cavity. Finally, with concrete cover on top new land is generated. The Tsunami-Flooding-Barrier 
protects against future tsunami and against flooding from typhoon. (Schematic cross section).
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These tubes and capsules are then introduced through an opening shown in Figure 6 into a 
barium-concrete chamber prepared below the bottom of the dump. Leakage to the ocean will 
be excluded when the material with highest radioactivity is stored in basin I and basins II and 
III also have been emptied, provided with a thick concrete layer, and used as dry dump for 
less-contaminated waste.
Figure 7. Standard free energy of formation of metal oxides as a function of temperature.
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The original sea walls with seaside slopes will be complemented with Tsunami-Flooding-
Barriers [11, 16] with the vertical wall on the seaside so that future tsunami and typhoons 
cannot harm the deposit development. Protection against heavy rain by a cover and against 
storm waves by a large floating fence in front of the TFB barriers [23] will prevent disturbance 
of the dump activities. With proper planning the sequence and the locality of the radioactive 
waste, the final radioactivity on top of the dump will not be higher than the natural value in 
Japan.
With this procedure the total costs for dismantling the reactors, for decontamination, for 
interim storage and for final storage of about 100 billion US dollars can be significantly 
reduced.
5. Conclusions and outlook
The Fukushima accident (and also the former Three-Mile-Island and Chernobyl catastrophes) 
has demonstrated that no engineer and manager with wide experiences and deciding power 
have been on site. In the case of Fukushima, urgent actions for very intense water spraying 
the fire and the cloud, for suction of the cloud, for manually opening the valve of the passive 
cooling system and for covering the ground with a thick concrete layer with slope of 2–3° 
depended on decisions of the owner’s headquarters in Tokyo. This was concentrated on the 
internal problems of the reactors, on political and publicity pressure and anyhow was under 
enormous stress and was not aware of the consequences for the local population and of the 
following national and international consequences. The experiences from the Three-Mile-
Island accident and the recommendations have been summarized in Ref. [24].
Competent reactor engineers should be educated who learn, besides nuclear technology, 
about all possible chemical reactions, corrosion and electro-corrosion, properties of the 
involved materials, failure of materials and components, aero-and hydrodynamics, meteorol-
ogy, and so on.-.
Another question is about the possibility for emergency interruption of nuclear fission by 
cadmium-indium alloys inside thin silver tubes and boron carbide/boron nitride/boron oxide 
composite tubes, whether such tubes can be inserted into Type-II generators until the safe 
generation III/III+ and IV reactors with a four-fold redundancy of emergency equipment will 
be developed.
It has become clear that the Fukushima accident could have been prevented if in the planning 
stage the worst-case scenario would have been considered by the plant owner and by the 
responsible ministry. Even after the accident caused by the unexpected tsunami, the collat-
eral damages could have been mitigated if a competent foresighted management had timely 
initiated the described procedures. An international emergency team of top engineers with 
multidisciplinary and industry experience could assist worldwide in case of heavy nuclear, 
chemical, fire and other catastrophes.
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Anyhow, with the development of the safe generation III and IV reactors the nuclear energy 
will become more dominating and increasingly replace the fossil energy in view of limited 
resources, of the CO
2
 climate problem and of overall safety concerns. The new high-temper-
ature reactors and fast breeders will have a significantly higher efficiency, consume less fuel 
and produce less radioactive waste. The renewable wind and solar energy is faced with the 
electricity storage problem, so that nuclear energy is more and more needed as reliable band 
energy. Frequently, the storage of radioactive waste is regarded as a problem with concern of 
the population regarding the site for a deep geological deposit. Recently the concept of a safe 
deposit the waste in a lonely mountain site has been developed which will be economic and 
faces less political resistance [25].
The common features of the three nuclear accidents (Three-Mile-Island 1979, Chernobyl 1986 
and Fukushima 2011) are the combination of personnel error and mistakes, deficiencies in 
reactor and safety component design, and component failures. Charles Perrow has formu-
lated the “Normal Accident Theory” that in processes of huge complexity, accidents are due 
to “unanticipated interaction of multiple failures in a complex system” [26–28]. Thus, for 
nuclear reactors with their enormous complexity all possible failure combinations should 
be analyzed and precautions with sufficient redundancy found before the plant is switched 
on. Of great importance is also multidisciplinary high-level education of reactor engineers 
and reactor managers and adequate training of operators to reduce accidents and their 
consequences.
It is hoped that the described experiences will assist in planning future reactors and in 
reducing collateral damage in case of a future accident which, however, hopefully will not 
occur.
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